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The National Personal Protective Technology Laboratory (NPPTL) of the National Institute for 
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) has undertaken a collaborative study with the Mine 
Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) to determine how well self-contained self-rescuers 
(SCSRs), deployed in accordance with Federal regulations (30 CFR 75.1714), withstand the 
underground coal mining environment with regard to both physical damage and aging. 
Apparatus tested included the CSE SR-100, the Draeger OXY-K Plus, the MSA Life-Saver 60, 
and the Ocenco EBA 6.5 and M-20.  
 
 This report presents findings regarding laboratory-tested SCSRs in the tenth phase of testing, 
from July 2004 to March 2006.  The SCSRs were tested on a breathing and metabolic simulator 
and on a human subject walking on a treadmill.  The tests performed in this study are not the 
tests used for certification (Title 42 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 84).  The tests 
performed in this study continue until the apparatus are empty to enable comparison of new 
versus deployed apparatus.  The method for obtaining deployed SCSRs for this evaluation was 
not a random selection from the deployed population of SCSRs.  We sought older apparatus with 
visible environmental impact rather than newer apparatus, and we attempted to sample a wide 
range of deployment modes.  Although the results of these tests are useful for observing 
performance of the tested SCSRs, they are not representative of all deployed SCSRs.  This report 
is the last of 10 report phases begun in 1982. Previous reports describe phases 1 through 9 
[Kyriazi et al. 1986; Kyriazi and Shubilla 1992, 1994, 1996, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006]  A new 
evaluation protocol, with revised sampling strategies, test methods, and reporting procedures, is 
currently being designed to enhance the applicability of the results. 
 
The results of these studies suggest that the large majority of SCSRs that pass their inspection 
criteria can be relied upon to provide a safe level of life support for mine escape purposes.  
However, the storage and handling in the mining environment seems to have caused performance 
degradation in some of the apparatus.  In this phase, phase 10, we found some CSE SR-100s (93 
tested) that exhibited high CO2 levels, stuck-together breathing hoses, starter-O2 failure, 
breathing hose punctures and tears, high breathing pressures, and loose particulates in the 
breathing hose.  The loose particulates caused coughing in human-subject tests.  One MSA Life-
Saver 60 (20 tested)  in this phase had a stuck-open relief valve.  One Ocenco EBA 6.5 (50 
tested) had an unattached O2  supply hose.  An unexplained phenomenon occurred with two 
Ocenco M-20s (20 tested): low O2 flow rates preventing their successful use.  Almost all of the 
failures noted involved units that failed their inspection criteria. 
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On June 21, 1981, U.S. coal mine operators 
were required to make available to each 
underground coal miner a self-contained 
self-rescuer (SCSR).  The regulations (30 
CFR 75.1714) require that each person in an 
underground coal mine wear, carry, or have 
immediate access to a device that provides 
respiratory protection with an oxygen (O2) 
source for at least 1 hour as approved 
according to the requirements found at Title 
42, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 84 (42 
CFR, Part 84).  The SCSRs are sealed to 
protect them from the underground mining 
environment. The sealed case that protects 
the apparatus from environmental and 
physical damage also makes it difficult to 
inspect.  No functional assessment can be 
made prior to actual use.  In order to assure 
proper functioning in an emergency, NPPTL 
and MSHA are jointly conducting a long-
term field evaluation (LTFE) of SCSRs 
deployed in underground coal mines.  
NPPTL and MSHA locate mines willing to 
participate in the study and trade deployed 
SCSRs for new ones; NPPTL then tests the 
deployed SCSRs.  The objective of this 
program was to evaluate the in-mine 
operational durability of deployed SCSRs.  
Of utmost concern is the successful 
performance of any SCSR that passes its 
approved inspection criteria.  Such apparatus 
must function successfully to enable a miner 
to escape safely during an emergency. 
 
Mines must conduct regular inspections of 
deployed units to ensure SCSR readiness.  
The criteria for these inspections are 
established by the manufacturers and 
include damage assessments of specific 
components by either visual inspection or 
other non-destructive testing.  Among the 
visual inspection criteria are evaluating the 
use indicators or gauges provided on the 
unit, checking the service life date, and 
visually assessing physical indications of 
wear.  Users must comply with the 
manufacturer’s specified conditions of use.  
SCSRs failing inspection or not complying 
with the conditions of use no longer meet 
the NIOSH/MSHA approval and should 
have been removed from service; however, 
we tested all units collected including some 
that we judged to fail inspection criteria 
since they were considered viable units by 
the users and were in service when 
collected.  The test results and data analysis 
include all units tested. 
 
The sampling strategy used in the initial 10 
phases of the LTFE program has had some 
changes in the mines and in the numbers of 
units of each approved type sampled.  At 
various phases sampling has concentrated on 
smaller mines, segregated mines by seam 
height, and the number of units collected has 
varied.  The protocol followed in each of the 
earlier phases is noted in the report for that 
phase.  The replacement of used units with 
new units from the same SCSR 
manufacturer likely introduced a sampling 
bias in the program, where an old or 
damaged unit from the mine could be 
replaced by a new unit from NIOSH. 




194 SCSRs were tested in the tenth phase of 
the study, from July 2004 to March 2006.  
Previous reports describe phases 1 through 9 
[Kyriazi et al. 1986; Kyriazi and Shubilla 
1992, 1994, 1996, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006].  
Ninety percent of the apparatus were 
targeted to be tested on a breathing and 
metabolic simulator (BMS) (Figure 1) and 
10% on human subjects on a treadmill 
(Figure 2).  In this phase, however, due to 
the lack of trained subjects meeting Human 
Subject Review Board constraints, we had 
only one test subject and were able to 
conduct only seven treadmill tests. 
The SCSRs tested were manufactured by 
CSE Corp., Dragerwerk AG, Mine Safety 
Appliances Co., Inc. (MSA), and Ocenco, 
Inc.  The number collected for this phase is 
indicated in Table 1.  
 
 
Figure 1. Breathing and Metabolic Simulator 
 
 





NIOSH selected the participating mines with 
regard to type of mining operation, coal bed 
height, and SCSR deployment mode in order 
to obtain a wide range of deployment 
impact.  Deployment modes included 
permanent storage on the ground, on a man-
trip or mining machine, daily carry-and-
store, and belt-worn.  At on-site visits, 
NIOSH staff, accompanied by MSHA 
inspectors, new units are exchanged for 
deployed units judged to meet the 
manufacturer’s criteria, and the mines are 
advised to remove rejected units from 
service.  Mines selected for participation in 
Phase 10 are identified in the 
Acknowledgements. 
Table 1. – SCSRs collected for evaluation 
Apparatus Number Collected 
Number 
Tested 
CSE SR-100 ............... 93 93 
Draeger OXY K-Plus . 22 21 
MSA Life-Saver 60 .... 20 20 
Ocenco EBA 6.5......... 50 50 
Ocenco M-20.............. 14 14 
    Total ....................... 199 198 
One OXY K-Plus test was aborted due to equipment 
malfunction. 
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Figure 3. Uncased and Cased CSE SR-100 Self-rescuer 
 
Figure 4. Cased and Uncased Draeger OXY K-Plus 
Self-rescuer 
 
Figure 5. Cased and Uncased MSA Life-Saver 60 Self-
rescuer 
 
Figure 6. Cased and Uncased Ocenco EBA 6.5 Self-
rescuer 
 
Figure 7. Partially Uncased and Uncased Ocenco M-20 
Self-rescuer 
 
4      Self-Contained Self-Rescuer Long Term Field Evaluation 
Evaluation Procedure  
 
O2 Constant-Flow Rate 
 
 The O2 constant-flow rate is checked 
on the Ocenco EBA 6.5, a compressed-O2 
apparatus.  The required flow rate is 1.5 
L/min at ambient temperature and pressure, 
dry (ATPD). 
 
Breathing Circuit Tightness 
 
 All apparatus in this study are 
checked for breathing circuit leak tightness 
after opening.  The leak test used was 
developed by Draeger for its BG-174 rescue 
breathing apparatus.  It is performed to 
determine how well the apparatus isolates 
the user from the environment, which may 
be irrespirable in an emergency.  Passing 
this test is not a requirement of the current 
regulations for these apparatus, however.  
The test permits a decay in breathing circuit 
pressure from -70 to -60 mm H2O in 1 
minute.  We have determined that just 
passing the test is equivalent to a leak rate of 
approximately 1 mL/min assuming an 
internal volume for both the apparatus and 
test stand of 1 L.  To give this some 
perspective, an in-leakage rate of 87 mL/min 
in a 10% CO atmosphere at a peak 
inhalation flow rate of 250 L/min (all 
volumes in this report are given at standard 
temperature (0o C) and pressure, dry, unless 
otherwise noted) will result in a CO in-
leakage concentration of 35 ppm, the 8-hour 
threshold limit value (TLV).  The 250 L/min 
peak inhalation flow rate is used because 
this occurs at roughly an 80 L/min 
ventilation rate, the highest likely such rate 
that can reasonably be expected of a user.   
 
At such a maximal work rate, inhalation 
pressure should not exceed -300 mm H2O, 
the highest negative pressure tolerated by 
80% of test subjects in a recent study 
[Hodgson 1993].  At the leak test pressure of 
-70 mm H2O, the proportional in-leakage 
rate resulting in the 8-hour TLV would be 
20 mL/min at a peak inhalation flow rate of 
58 L/min.  The Draeger leak test, therefore, 




 The BMS test consisted of the 
average metabolic work rate exhibited by 
the 50th-percentile miner weighing 87 kg 
while performing the 1-hour man-test 4 as 
described in 42 CFR 84.  However, even 
though the average work rate is the same, 
LTFE testing is not equivalent to 
certification testing.  The certification 
testing imposes high and low work rates that 
the average work rate, used in the LTFE, 
does not.  Also, the stressor levels are 
continuously monitored in the LTFE, 
whereas they are sampled only between 
work activities in the certification testing.  In 
addition, LTFE testing continues until the 
apparatus is empty, whereas testing during 
certification ends at a predetermined time—
the rated duration—even though the 
capacity of the apparatus usually exceeds 
this.  Therefore, an apparatus that fails 
LTFE testing would not necessarily fail 
certification, and vice versa.  In the LTFE 
treadmill testing, the human subject walked 
at whatever speed and grade elicited an O2 
consumption rate of 1.35 L/min.  The 
metabolic parameters for both BMS and the 
human subject are given in Table 2. 





In both the BMS and treadmill testing, the 
stressors monitored were inhaled levels of 
CO2 and O2, end-of-inhalation wet- and dry-
bulb temperatures, and peak inhalation and 
exhalation breathing pressures.  In the BMS 
testing, however, average inhaled values of 
gas concentration were measured as opposed 
to the minimum levels of CO2 and maximum 
levels of O2 in the treadmill testing.  
Average inhaled gas values include the 
effect of apparatus dead space, whereas 
minimum levels of CO2, for example, are 
only the lowest level of gas concentration 
during inhalation.  The BMS measures 
average inhaled values by electronically 
summing all of the CO2 and O2 over each 
inhalation cycle, weighted by the 
instantaneous flow rate.  The BMS also 
measures minimum inhaled CO2 levels. 
 
Test Termination Criteria 
 
Tests on the BMS were terminated upon 
exhaustion of the O2 supply as indicated by 
inhalation pressures reaching -200 mm H2O; 
coinciding with an empty breathing bag.  If 
average inhaled CO2 values exceed 10% or 
O2 values fall below 10%, the accuracy of 
the metabolism of the BMS becomes 
questionable.  Tests were, therefore, 
terminated at those points or shortly 
thereafter.  In addition, if pressures exceed 
the range of the pressure transducer 
(approximately 500 mm H2O) the accuracy 
of the gas analyzers is affected providing 
another reason for test termination.  
Treadmill tests were terminated when the O2 
supply was exhausted, if minimum inhaled 
CO2 exceeded 4%, if maximum inhaled O2 
fell below 15%, or if the test subject stopped 
because of subjectively high breathing 
pressures or temperatures. 
 
Wilcoxon Rank-Sum Test 
 
The Wilcoxon rank-sum test was performed 
for each monitored stressor to determine 
whether or not the deployed units behaved 
differently from new units.  The test 
evaluates the hypothesis that the two 
samples are from populations with the same 
mean.  The values from both samples are 
ranked in ascending order of magnitude.  If 
the sum of the ranks of the smaller sample 
(T) (in this case, new units) falls within the 
acceptable range for the given sample sizes, 
then there is not sufficient evidence at the 
specified probability level (α = 0.05, two-
sided) to say that the means of the two 
samples differ.  The rank-sum test does not 
rely upon the assumptions that either the 
new- or deployed-unit data are normal 
distributions or that they have identical 
variances, as does the t-test for two 
populations of independent samples.  One 
limitation of the Wilcoxon rank-sum test is 
that it does not distinguish between large 
and small differences in values.  The results 
of the α = 0.05, two-sided, Wilcoxon rank-
sum tests are presented in Table 3.  The 
probability of T falling outside the given 
range is 0.05 if the populations have the 
same mean. 
Table 2. – BMS and human-subject metabolic parameters 
Metabolic workload BMS Human Subject 
02 consumption rate                  L/min. 1.35 1.35 
CO2 production rate                  L/min. 1.15 1.15 
Ventilation rate                         L/minute. 30.0 29 
Tidal volume                             L/breath. 1.68 1.93 
Respiratory frequency               breaths/min. 17.9 15 
Peak respiratory flow rate:   
    Inhalation                              L/minute 89 Not measured 
    Exhalation                             L/minute 71 Not measured 
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Table 3. – Wilcoxon rank sum test results 
 
Apparatus Duration  Average inhaled CO2









 Range T  Range T  Range T Range T Range T Range T  Range T 
SR-100  101-211 138  101-211 131  101-211 154 96-200 236 101-211 242 101-211 174  101-211 160
OXY K-Plus
  45-105 72  42-96 86  44-100 64 44-100 84 45-105 107 45-105 70  45-105 84 
Life-Saver 
60   58-124 92  45-105 64  58-124 98 54-114 79 58-124 100 58-124 123  58-124 92 
EBA 6.5  29-91 48  29-91 40  29-91 69 28-88 87 28-88 88 29-91 78  29-91 40 
M-20  17-51 52  17-51 46  17-51 34 17-51 50 17-51 54 17-51 50  17-51 26 
T = Sum of the ranks of the smaller sample (new units). 
 
CSE Induced Noise Test 
 
CSE developed a test to identify apparatus 
that have sustained internal damage, based 
on a correlation between loose particles in 
the chemical bed and CO2 breakthrough 
during the last rest interval of a 1-hour Man 
Test #4.  This was established by testing SR-
100s on the CSE breathing simulator 
performing NIOSH variable-work rate 
certification tests.  The Acoustic Solids 
Movement Detector (ASMD) analyzes the 
noise induced in the unit by shaking it in a 
controlled manner.  The noise produced by 
the SCSR when shaken is used as an 
indicator of shock and vibration damage 
incurred by the chemical bed within the 
SCSR.  In the field, this assessment is made 
using a hand-held instrument provided by 
CSE.  A laboratory version of the ASMD 
test involves rotating the SR-100 in an 
anechoic chamber to measure the noise 
levels in decibels (dB).  Various frequency 
ranges are weighted differently and result in 
a composite dB rating for each apparatus.  A 
unit with a composite rating of higher than 
60 dB fails the test. NIOSH performs the 
laboratory version of the ASMD test as part 
of the LTFE inspection. Excessive noise as 
evaluated by either of the test instruments is 
an indication of chemical-bed damage that 
may adversely affect the performance of the 
SCSR.  SCSRs failing the ASMD test must 
be removed from service.  
 
Problem Investigation Procedure 
 
Any problems encountered with SCSRs, 
such as hidden damage or anomalous 
performance, were reported for investigation 
under the Certified Product Investigation 
Program (CPIP).  These investigations and 
their outcomes are reported in Appendix 1. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
Experience with each model of apparatus is 
discussed separately. The minute-average 
values of the monitored stressors were 
averaged over the entire test duration and 
are presented graphically (Figures 8-12) for 
each apparatus by stressor.  The values for 
new units tested on the BMS can be 
compared with those for deployed units also 
tested on the BMS.  To some extent, they 
may also be compared with those for 
deployed units tested on the human subject 
on a treadmill.  Because the human subject 
differs from the BMS in respiratory 
frequency, treadmill tests cannot be 
considered equivalent to the BMS tests even 
though the O2 consumption rate is the same.  
Missing data points indicate test equipment 
malfunction or inability to instrument 
apparatus. 
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Figure 8. CSE SR-100 test results 
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Figure 9. Draeger OXY K-Plus test results 
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Figure 10. MSA Life Saver 60 test results 
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Figure 11. Ocenco EBA 6.5 test results 
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Figure 12. Ocenco M-20 test results 
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Manufacturer’s Inspection Criteria 
 
 Some apparatus were found to fail their inspection criteria either after cleaning or 
performing the induced noise test.  Table 4 lists the apparatus failing inspection and the reason 
for failure.  The apparatus were tested for reasons of scientific interest; however, if performance 
problems were encountered, the manufacturers were not considered responsible since the 
apparatus should have been removed from service. 
 
Table 4. – Apparatus failing visual inspection 
 
Model SN Reason Performance evaluation 
CSE SR-100 49791 High dB level Terminated for 10% CO2
CSE SR-100 50243 High dB level Terminated for 10% CO2
CSE SR-100 54559 High dB level 6.4% CO2 when empty 
55078 High dB and severely dented top lid Terminated for 10% CO2CSE SR-100 
CSE SR-100 55138 High dB level 9.2% CO2 when empty 
CSE SR-100 57046 High dB level 8.5% CO2 when empty 
CSE SR-100 64967 High dB level Terminated for 10% CO2
CSE SR-100 68802 High dB level 9.0% CO2 when empty 
76194 Top moisture indicator cracked 7.5% CO2 when empty CSE SR-100 
CSE SR-100 76695 Top moisture indicator cracked 4.1% CO2 when empty 
81496 High dB and severely dented bottom lid Terminated for 10% CO2CSE SR-100 
82355 High dB and dent in top front seal Terminated for 10% CO2CSE SR-100 
CSE SR-100 90491 High dB level 5.5% CO2 when empty 
91812 Bottom moisture indicator cracked OK CSE SR-100 
CSE SR-100 92620 Moisture indicator cracked OK 
92988 Bottom moisture indicator cracked OK CSE SR-100 
CSE SR-100 96917 High dB level 5.9% CO2 when empty 
99361 High dB level 5.7% CO2 when empty CSE SR-100 
ARLN 0099 Outwardly dented and loose belt plate OK Draeger OXY K-Plus 
Draeger OXY K-Plus ARLN 0478 Dented belt plate OK 
Draeger OXY K-Plus ARME 0159 Red tamper clip missing OK 
Ocenco EBA 6.5 91010115 Dented canister OK 
91020198 Dirt inside case and rusty canister OK Ocenco EBA 6.5 
Ocenco EBA 6.5 94020147 Crack in case bottom OK 
Ocenco EBA 6.5 94080019 Dented canister OK 
94080023 Stress cracks in case bottom; shifted bottle band OK Ocenco EBA 6.5 
Ocenco EBA 6.5 94080024 Shifted bottle band OK 
Ocenco EBA 6.5 94080245 Cracks in case bottom OK 
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Table 4. – Apparatus failing visual inspection 
 
Model SN Reason Performance evaluation 
Ocenco EBA 6.5 97080496 Misaligned gasket OK 
97080550 Spray painted corner prevented inspection OK Ocenco EBA 6.5 
97080861 Crack in case bottom and spray-painted case OK Ocenco EBA 6.5 
99030820 Top strap unanchored on one side, then fell off OK Ocenco EBA 6.5 
99031179 Screw loose on top strap; SN tag fell inside case OK Ocenco EBA 6.5 
Ocenco M-20 511184 Security ball missing OK 
Ocenco M-20 511196 Security ball missing OK 
Ocenco M-20 511383 Security ball missing OK 
Ocenco M-20 511415 Security ball missing Terminated for 10% CO2
LiOH fused to regulator 
occluded O2 flow preventing 
use 
Ocenco M-20 511426 Security ball missing 





Table 5. – Summary of collected Devices 
 
Terminated before 60 
minute  








CSE SR-100...............  93 18 93 1 14 
Draeger OXY K-Plus.  22 3 21 0 0 
MSA Life-Saver 60 ...  20  20 0 0 
Ocenco EBA 6.5 ........  50 12 50 1 hose disconnected  
Ocenco M-20 .............  14 all out of date 5 visual  problems 14  3 
    Total.......................  199  198   
 One OXY K-Plus test was aborted due to equipment malfunction.                                                
                          Units were terminated either for low O2 or high CO2 
 
 




Eighteen of 93 (19%) units failed their 
inspection criteria (See Table 4.).  Eighty-six 
of the 93 units passed the leak-tightness test.  
Of the seven new units that were leak-tested, 
6 passed the test.  The leak test is not 
required by CSE, nor by NIOSH for 
certification. 
 
The Wilcoxon rank-sum tests for the CSE 
SR-100 showed that, as in the past three 
phases, wet- and dry-bulb temperatures were 
significantly higher in new units than in 
deployed units.  Since temperature is 
indicative of chemical reaction, this 
apparently shows deployed units having 
lower levels of chemical reaction.  Since no 
statistically significant difference was found 
with regard to CO2 levels, however, 





Most of the tests were terminated empty, but 
seven were terminated for high CO2 levels 
and two for low O2 levels.  Of the seven 
tests terminated for high CO2 levels (10% 
average inhaled CO2) six apparatus failed 
inspection criteria and should have been 
removed from service: five apparatus had 
noise-test dB levels higher than 60; one 
apparatus had a cracked moisture indicator 
lens and a large dent in the bottom lid.  The 
other apparatus passed its inspection criteria 
and had a punctured breathing hose in 
addition to the high CO2 levels.  The two 
apparatus with tests terminated for low O2 
levels (10% average inhaled O2) both passed 
their inspection criteria.  One also had a 
punctured breathing hose and no starter O2. 
The low O2 level in this apparatus when 
terminated at 68 minutes can be attributed to 
the in-leakage of ambient air through the 
hose puncture.  The other apparatus had 
insufficient starter O2 and lasted only 17 
minutes before O2 levels fell below 10%.  
No obvious reason was found for this 
behavior.   
 
Induced Noise Test 
 
The correlation coefficient between the dB 
levels obtained in the ASMD induced-noise 
test and the test-average, average inhaled 
CO2 levels (Figure 13) was 0.71 for the 
apparatus tested in this phase. 
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High Breathing Pressures 
 
Twenty-nine deployed apparatus 
reached exhalation breathing pressures of 
+200 mm H2O while 23 reached inhalation 
pressures of -300 mm H2O.  These pressures 
were the limits of tolerance for 80% of test 
subjects in a study contracted by the Bureau 
of Mines (Hodgson, 1993).  Two new units 
also exceeded these pressures; one of which 
was terminated for high breathing pressures 
at 60 minutes. 
 
Premature CO2 Breakthrough 
 
Table 5 shows that 61 of 93 
deployed apparatus tested experienced CO2 
breakthrough before expenditure of the O2 
supply.  Four in eight of the new units also 
experienced CO2 breakthrough before 
expenditure of the O2 supply.  The response 
to high inhaled levels of CO2 will be 
increased ventilation rates in most users, 
approximately doubling with 4% CO2.  
Increased ventilation rates will result in 
higher breathing pressures experienced by 
the user.  Breathing resistance in the SR-100 
increases rapidly toward end-of-life even in 
some new apparatus, and elevated CO2 
levels will only add to this. 
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Table 6. –CSE SR-100 4% CO2 breakthrough times, minutes 









Deployed:  BMS 17 51 10.0 
 18 52 10.6 
 18 64 10.3 
 22 50 10.6 
 22 51 10.0 
 22 66 10.0 
 24 56 10.3 
 29 76 9.0 
 33 46 10.5 
 39 70 9.2 
 45 68 8.5 
 47 73 9.0 
 51 70 8.5 
 52 65 10.0 
 54 61 4.3 
 54 64 5.5 
 55 66 7.5 
 57 67 6.0 
 57 71 5.9 
 59 69 6.7 
 59 71 7.2 
 60 60 4.0 
 60 69 6.4 
 61 63 5.1 
 61 65 4.9 
 61 68 6.0 
 61 71 6.1 
 61 73 8.5 
 62 63 4.2 
 63 66 4.6 
 63 68 5.4 
 63 73 7.5 
 64 65 4.1 
 64 68 4.9 
 65 65 4.0 
 65 65 4.2 
 65 66 4.4 
 66 67 4.4 
 66 68 4.4 
 66 68 4.6 
 66 68 4.6 
 66 69 4.9 
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Table 6. –CSE SR-100 4% CO2 breakthrough times, minutes 









 66 69 5.1 
 67 67 4.0 
 67 67 4.1 
 67 68 5.7 
 67 69 4.6 
 67 69 4.8 
 67 71 5.9 
 68 68 4.4 
 68 69 4.2 
 68 69 4.4 
 69 69 4.1 
 69 69 4.1 
 69 70 4.1 
 69 70 4.2 
 69 72 4.6 
 70 70 4.0 
 70 70 4.1 
 71 72 4.1 
 72 72 4.0 
New:  BMS 49 67 8.3 
 51 65 6.5 
 58 66 5.6 
 63 69 5.6 
 
 
Insufficient Starter Oxygen/Manual 
Start/Coughing/Hypoxia 
 
Fifteen units had little or no starter oxygen, 
requiring a manual start before beginning or 
shortly after beginning the test.  Manual 
starts consist of exhaling into the apparatus 
until the breathing bag is full (3-6 breaths). 
Since exhaled breath contains sub-ambient 
levels of O2 (approximately 17%) the 
inhalation levels of O2 will start at that point 
and decline unless the chemical in the bed is 
very reactive.   With the SR-100 inhalation 
O2 levels  drop below 15% within a couple 
of minutes, bottoming out at approximately 
12% before rising.  One apparatus with 
insufficient starter oxygen required four 
manual starts before the chemical reaction 
kicked in after 20 minutes, terminating for 
high CO2 at 68 minutes. 
 
In both of the human-subject tests, the user 
coughed to some degree when donning the 
apparatus.  This was due to the inhalation of 
loose particles of corn starch which the 
manufacturer uses in the breathing hose to 
absorb saliva.  The corn starch prevents the 
saliva from reaching the KO2 bed where it 
would speed up the chemical reaction and 
waste O2.  After noticing the corn starch in 
the breathing hoses, it was decided to shake 
out the loose particles before testing the 
units.  This resulted in dislodging small 
pieces of metal (end-cuttings from the wire-
mesh heat-exchanger) from the hoses, 
occurring in 21 apparatus. (The 
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manufacturer has added a step during 
manufacture to blow out the loose metal 
cuttings.)  Given these circumstances, the 
donning procedure was changed such that 
the human subject is now instructed to wet 
down the loose particles by exhaling 
repeatedly into the unit.  Since this dilutes 
the starter O2 and is essentially a manual 
start, as the manufacturer instructs in case of 
lack of starter O2 (which happened in 16% 
of the units tested), we decided to delay 
activating the starter O2 to see if the O2 
levels fell like they did in BMS tests.  They 
did.  However, when O2 fell below 15%, the 




 Ten units had breathing hoses with 
severe creases with the hose walls sticking 
to each other.  A modest effort to unstick the 
hose and open the flow path was attempted; 
however, in previous phases, the hoses tore 
when attempting to unstick them.  
Therefore, if the hoses were badly stuck, 
they were left stuck and partially occluded.  
The manufacturer has asserted that this 
degradation is caused by heat exposure. 
In eight units, there was evidence of dirt 
and/or past water leakage into the case. The 
color indicators were blue in all units.  All 
had some degree of performance 
degradation, either high CO2, low O2, or 
high breathing pressures. 
 
There were four instances in which the 
breathing hose was either punctured or slit, 
apparently from being pressed against sharp 
internal components.  Such holes would 
permit toxic gases and nitrogen to enter the 
breathing circuit in emergency use, 
compromising the effectiveness of the 
apparatus.  In response, the manufacturer 
has changed its packing procedures. 
 
The lids were stuck and difficult to remove 




Of 15 units terminated at less than 60 
minutes duration, only one unit passed the 
initial inspection. Almost 20% of the 
samples obtained for CSE units did not pass 
the manufacturer’s Inspection criteria. 
 
 
Draeger OXY K-Plus 
 
Three of 22 units (14%) failed their 
inspection criteria (See Table 4.).  All the 
deployed units passed the leak-tightness test; 
three new units passed the test and one 
failed. 
 
The Wilcoxon rank-sum tests for the 
Draeger show that new units had 
significantly higher dry-bulb temperatures 
than deployed units.  Dry-bulb temperature 
is indicative of chemical bed reaction; 
however, since there were no performance 
problems in any of the deployed units, this is 
of no concern to users. 
All units were terminated empty, the 
preferred mode for termination. 
 
One apparatus had a loose back plate that 
was (inexplicably) outwardly dented and 
should have been removed from service; it 
performed normally, however. 
 
The computer controlling the BMS froze 
twice during one test causing delays in 
testing.  After a 15-minute delay the second 
time, the apparatus could not be restarted 
and the test was aborted.  The apparatus had 
been performing normally before that, 
however. 
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 MSA Life-Saver 60 
 
 
All 20 of the Life-Saver 60s passed their 
inspection criteria (See Table 4.).  Twelve 
deployed units passed the leak-tightness test 
and eight failed; all three new units passed. 
 
The Wilcoxon rank-sum tests show that new 
units were not significantly different from 
deployed units in any measured parameter.  
After adding in four more baseline tests of 
new units having lower durations of the 
three previous baseline tests, the statistical 
significance of lower durations in deployed 
units found in previous phases has 
disappeared.  This could be for a number of 
reasons including actual performance 
difference in the two batches of new units, 
actual performance differences in the 
samples of deployed units, or difference in 
some testing parameter between the first 
batch of new units tested in 1999 and the 
second batch tested in 2004.  In any case, 
the difference is minimal. 
 
All units were terminated empty, the 
preferred mode for termination. 
 
The chlorate candle of one unit activated 
immediately upon opening the apparatus 
case. This occurred on one of three new 
units, also.  Although this would not 
necessarily compromise successful use of 
the apparatus, users should be made aware 
that it could happen.  In contrast, the candle 
of one unit did not fire until minute 55 of the 
test. 
 
One apparatus had its ID strap inside-out as 
well as its relief valve stuck open.  The relief 
valve was manually closed before starting 
the test and the apparatus performed 
normally.  A user would have been at risk of 
inhaling toxic gases in the ambient air 
through the relief valve if it were open to 
ambient as found. 
 
 OCENCO EBA 6.5 
 
 
Twelve of 50 (24%) units failed their 
inspection criteria (See Table 4.).  Nine 
deployed units passed the leak-tightness test 
and 41 failed; one new unit passed the test 
and three failed.  The leak-tightness failures 
are observed to be due either to leakage 
between the rubber mouthpiece boot and the 
hard-plastic check-valve frame or back-flow 
through the relief valve. 
 
The Wilcoxon rank-sum tests show that new 
units were not significantly different from 
deployed units in any measured parameter.  
 
All tests were terminated empty, the 
preferred mode for termination.  One caveat: 
the O2 supply hose of one unit was not 
attached to the breathing bag making the 
unit unusable unless the user were very 
familiar with the apparatus and could re-
attach the hose which we did for testing. It 
performed normally and terminated empty 
as well. 
 
The wide range of average inhaled O2 test 
averages is due to the difference in the 
apparatus O2 regulator flow rates, which 
ranged in this phase from 1.02 to 1.90 L/min 
ATPD.  The O2 concentration in a breathing 
circuit will rise if the O2 supply rate is 
higher than the O2 consumption rate. 
 
We tested numerous apparatus with visible 
damage that should have been removed from 
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service (see Table 4.).  Four units had cracks 
in their outer cases indicating severe impact, 
one of which also had a shifted cylinder 
band.  Two units had dented canisters, one 
severely so and had LiOH in the O2 supply 
hose which undoubtedly would have caused 
coughing.  Three units had displaced 
canister gaskets.  One unit had a rusty 
canister.  One had a case strap that was 
unattached on one side which fell off 
completely during cleaning.  The EBA 6.5 is 
difficult to open without the presence of the 
case straps.  Another had loose screws on 
the case straps and a serial number tag that 
had fallen inside the case and could not be 
read.  Finally, the O2 supply hose of one unit 
tore when removing it to measure the O2 
flow rate.  This indicates material decay, 
although it would not have prevented 
successful use of the apparatus unless 





All 14 of the apparatus had exceeded their 
service life dates by three or four months 
and had been removed from service.  Since 
the M-20 is not in wide use and is difficult 
to obtain, we took the apparatus knowing 
that they were technically out of 
compliance.  In addition to being beyond the 
end of their service lives, five of the units 
(36%) failed their inspection criteria for 
additional reasons (see Table 4.).  Three 
deployed units passed the leak-tightness test; 
12 failed.  Two new units passed the leak-
tightness test; one failed. 
 
The Wilcoxon rank-sum tests show that the 
durations of deployed units were 
significantly lower than new units and that 
the dry-bulb temperatures of deployed units 
were significantly lower than new units.  
Both differences were small, however, and 
are only of academic interest. 
 
One unit was terminated simultaneously 
empty and with 10% CO2 at 18 minutes.  Its 
security ball was missing, however, so we 
cannot say with certainty that it had not been 
previously opened.  One unit was terminated 
at four minutes due to low (10%) O2.  
Another unit was terminated at two minutes 
with insufficient bag volume.  These last 
two suffered from low O2 flow as described 
below. 
 
Two apparatus were found with large 
quantities of LiOH powder in the breathing 
bag that apparently escaped the chemical 
bed, working its way through the bottom 
filter.  This has been found in the past with 
no apparent effect on performance.  In these 
cases, however, the O2 flow rate on both 
units was severely reduced resulting in low 
O2 levels and insufficient breathing bag 
volume, both preventing successful use of 
the apparatus.  Dismantling of the apparatus 
revealed hardened LiOH powder adhered to 
the outside of the demand valve/O2 
regulator.  It is assumed that the same 
phenomenon is found on the inside of the 
regulator, restricting O2 flow.  We cannot 
explain the phenomenon of powdered LiOH 
in the breathing bag adjacent to LiOH fused 
to the surface of the anodized aluminum 
regulators.  If it is caused by the passage of 
time, we would certainly urge all users to 
pay close attention to the service life date.  
Since the other 12 apparatus did not 
experience this phenomenon, however, time 
alone is unlikely the cause.  Ocenco 
provided no insights or explanation other 
than to point out that the apparatus were 
beyond their service life dates. 
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Five apparatus showed evidence of mine 
dust in-leakage.  In addition, the security 
ball seal of five units were missing.  These 
factors did not correlate with any 






The results of this study suggest that the 
large majority of SCSRs that pass their 
inspection criteria can be relied upon to 
provide a safe level of life support for mine 
escape purposes.  However, the mining 
environment seems to have caused some 
performance degradation in all the apparatus 
to some degree.  The CSE SR-100 is 
exhibiting problems of CO2 exceeding 4% 
(66%), stuck-together breathing hoses 
(11%), starter-O2 failure (16%), breathing 
hose punctures and tears (4%), breathing 
pressures exceeding +200 mm H2O or -300 
mm H2O (31%), and loose particulates in the 
breathing hose (23%).  The loose 
particulates caused coughing in human-
subject tests. 
 
 We found no significant problems with the 
Draeger OXY K Plus in this phase. 
 
The MSA Life-Saver 60 had only one 
significant problem in this phase: a stuck-
open relief valve that would have 
compromised its successful use unless 
closed before using. 
 
In this phase, the only significant finding for 
the Ocenco EBA 6.5 was an unattached O2  
supply hose.  Unless re-attached, this unit 
could not have been used for a successful 
escape. 
 
An unexplained phenomenon occurred with 
the Ocenco M-20: low O2 flow rates 
preventing their successful use.  This 
phenomenon was seemingly caused by 
hardened deposits of LiOH on the anodized 
aluminum regulator occluding the O2 flow.  
We have seen LiOH in the breathing bag 
before; we have not seen a performance 
effect until now.  Since the apparatus had 
exceeded their five-year service lives by 
three months, Ocenco could not be held 
accountable for this problem. 
 





Without the cooperation of the coal mines and MSHA field offices, this study would not be 
possible. The following coal mines and MSHA field offices participated in the tenth phase of this 
study: 
 
MSHA Office: Wilkes-Barre District Office  Dis 1 
   
Mine Name: 7 ft. Slope 
Mailing Address: R.D. 2, Box 118 C, Hegins, PA 17938 
   
Mine Name: Buck Mt. Slope, S&M Coal Co. 
Mailing Address: 1744 East Ave., Tower City PA 17980 
   
Mine Name: Joliett Coal Co.  #3 Vein Slope 
Mailing Address: 837 E. Grand Ave. Tower City PA 17980 
   
Mine Name: Orchard Coal Co.  Orchard Slope 
Mailing Address: 214 Vaux Ave Tremont PA  17981 
   
Mine Name: RS&W Coal Co. 
Mailing Address: 207 Creek Rd Klingerstown PA  17941 
   
Mine Name: Little Buck Coal Co.  #2 Slope 
Mailing Address: 57 Lincoln Rd.  Pine Grove  PA 17963 
   
Mine Name: R&D Coal Co.  Buck Mountain Slope 
Mailing Address: P.O. Box 214 Vaux Ave. Tremont PA 17981 
   
Mine Name: R&R Coal Co. 
Mailing Address: 538 W. Center St. Donaldson PA 17981 
   
Mine Name: Six M  Slope #1 
Mailing Address: 482 High Rd  Ashland PA 17921 
  
  
MSHA Office: New Stanton Dis. Office  Dis. 2 
   
Mine Name: Enlow Fork Mine 
Mailing Address: 920 East Finley Dr., West Finley, PA  15377 
  
  
MSHA Office: Morgantown District Office  Dis. 3 
   
Mine Name: Double H Mining Co. Inc.,   Cabin Mine 
Mailing Address: P.O. Box 338   Morgantown, WV 26501 
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Mine Name: Odyssey Energy Mine #1 
Mailing Address: PO Box 431  Bruceton Mills 26525 
   
Mine Name: Dana Mining, Prine #1 Mine 
Mailing Address: 2141 Lazzelle Union Rd. Maidsville WV 26541 
   
Mine Name: Whitetail Kittanning 
Mailing Address: 




MSHA Office: Mt. Hope District Office   Dis. 4 
   
Mine Name: Ambush Mining #2 
Mailing Address: H.G. Caretta WV 
   
Mine Name: 
Rocksprings  Development Co.; Camp Creek 
Mine 
Mailing Address: P.O. Box 390 East Lynn WV 15512 
   
Mine Name: Pinnacle Mining Co., LLC;  Pinnacle Mining Co  
Mailing Address: P.O. Box 330, Pinville, WV 28474 
   
Mine Name: US Steel Mining Co.  # 50 
Mailing Address: Box 338 Pineville WV 24874Pinnacle Creek Rd. 
  
  
MSHA Office: Pikeville District Office  Dis 6 
   
Mine Name: Excel Mining, Mine #3 
Mailing Address: 100 Fae Ramsey Lane,  Pikeville KY  41501 
   
Mine Name: Consol Mil Creek 
Mailing Address: PO Box 10 Deane KY 41812 
   
Mine Name: Excel Mining, LLC Mine# 2 
Mailing Address: HC6T Box 615 Pilgrim, KY 41250 
   
Mine Name: Patrick Processing LLC. 
Mailing Address: 458 Village Lane, Hazard KY 41701 
  
  
MSHA Office: Barbourville District Office, Dis. 7 
   
Mine Name: Bledsoe Coal, Shamrock Coal 
Mailing Address: P.O. Box 349 Bledsoe Ky. 40810 
   
Mine Name: Bell County Coal Corp., Coal Creek 
Mailing Address: RT. 1 Box 290 Middlesboro KY 
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Mine Name: Consol KY,  Jones Fork Rt 80 Slope 
Mailing Address: P.O. 13 Mousic KY 
   
Mine Name: Lake View Mine 
Mailing Address: P.O. Box 784 Hazard KY  41702 
   
Mine Name: Stillhouse Mining LLC, NO 1 Mine 
Mailing Address: P.O. Box 1226 Norton, VA 24273 
   
Mine Name: Tennco Inc. Valley Creek #2 
Mailing Address: P.O. 16 Harrsgate TN 37752 
  
  
MSHA Office: Vincennes Dis. Office Dis. 8 
   
Mine Name: Air Quality Mine, Black Beauty 
Phone No.: 812-743-2910 
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Appendix 1  
Certified Product Investigation Program (CPIP)  











TN-13958 2/28/2005 8/10/2005 CSE SR - 100 High CO2 unit had moisture active bed. TC-13F-0239 
Improper user handling 
of unit 
TN-14363 1/27/2006 9/22/2006 CSE SR - 100 
Visible holes and 




requirements and CO2 
off gas measured was 
with acceptable ranges. 
MSA 
TN-14163 8/12/2005 3/13/2006 MSA Lifesaver 60 
Tear in breathing bag of 
Lifesaver 60. TC-13F-0385 
Tested units met O2 
requirements and units 
in field were 
approaching end of 
service life. 
Ocenco 
TN-14261 10/24/2005 3/24/2006 OCN M – 20 Low O2 flow and demand valve malfunction. TC-13F-0269 
Units were three 
months beyond the end 
of carried-service 
interval. 
TN-14366 1/30/2006 16/6/2006 OCN M – 20.2 
Presence of lithium 
hydroxide in mouthpiece of 
respirator caused user to 
cough. 
30 stored units were 
tested in Man Test 4 
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